Yes. KeePass encrypts your database with AES-256 or ChaCha20, is fully open source under GPL v2, and stores nothing on any server. Its main risks are user-side: a weak master password, no backups, or downloading a tampered copy from an unofficial mirror.

Has KeePass ever been hacked?

The KeePass program has had documented vulnerabilities over the years — for example CVE-2023-32784, which could leak the master password from a memory dump and was fixed in KeePass 2.54 — but there has never been a breach of user vaults, because there is no server holding them.

Is KeePass safer than cloud password managers?

It removes a different risk. KeePass has no server to breach, so incidents like the 2022 LastPass vault theft cannot happen to it; a cloud manager protects you better against losing your own device or file. Which is safer depends on whether your bigger risk is a vendor breach or your own backups. See KeePass vs Bitwarden.

What encryption does KeePass use?

KeePass encrypts databases with AES-256 by default, with ChaCha20 available, and derives the key from your master password using AES-KDF or Argon2 (KDBX 4). These are the same algorithm families used across the industry, as documented in the official KeePass help.

Can I trust a KeePass download from this site?

You do not have to trust us — and should not have to trust anyone: our buttons link to the official SourceForge distribution, we publish the SHA-256 checksums we computed, and you can verify your file against the author’s own integrity page before running it.

Can someone open my .kdbx file without the master password?

No — not with any practical attack, provided your master password is strong. The file is encrypted with AES-256 or ChaCha20 and there is no backdoor, no recovery mechanism and no vendor who could unlock it. That cuts both ways: if you forget the master password, the data is gone for everyone, including you.

Has KeePass ever been independently audited?

Yes. KeePass was selected for a public code audit under the European Commission’s EU-FOSSA project in 2016, which reported no critical vulnerabilities. Beyond formal audits, its open source and the independent reimplementations of the .kdbx format mean the code and format are under continuous outside review.

What is the weakest point of KeePass security?

The master password, and the machine KeePass runs on. Database encryption cannot compensate for a guessable passphrase or an already-compromised PC with a keylogger. A long passphrase and a clean system matter more than any setting inside KeePass.

Home › Is KeePass safe?

By Jack Turner, keepasspc.com · Updated 2026-07-14

Is KeePass safe? An honest security analysis

Yes — KeePass is safe: it is a fully open-source password manager that encrypts your vault locally with AES-256 or ChaCha20 and never sends it to any server, which means the class of breach that hit cloud vaults simply cannot happen to it. The honest answer also includes what KeePass does not protect you from, and its own security track record — both are below.

The KeePass security model in plain terms

Your entire vault is one .kdbx file, encrypted with AES-256 (default) or ChaCha20. The encryption key is derived from your master password through a deliberately slow key-derivation function — AES-KDF or, in KDBX 4 databases, Argon2 — so brute-forcing a decent passphrase is computationally impractical. All of this is inspectable: the source code is public, and the format is implemented independently by KeePassXC and multiple mobile apps, which is strong evidence the format has no hidden surprises.

Because nothing ever leaves your device, the vendor-breach scenario is structurally absent. There is no KeePass account, no KeePass server, no KeePass database of users to steal. The 2022 LastPass incident — encrypted vaults exfiltrated from vendor storage — is the exact scenario the KeePass architecture makes impossible.

KeePass's actual security track record

Honesty requires the other side. KeePass is software, and software has bugs:

CVE-2023-32784 (2023): the master password could be partially recovered from a process memory dump. Fixed in KeePass 2.54. It required an attacker who could already read your machine's memory.
Triggering discussion, not a CVE: KeePass's export feature has been debated (an attacker with write access to its config could add a malicious export trigger). The author added confirmation requirements; again it presupposes a compromised machine.

The pattern in every known issue: they require an attacker who already controls your computer. That is the true boundary of KeePass security — it protects a file at rest superbly, and cannot protect you on a machine that is already compromised. No password manager can.

How can you make KeePass even safer?

KeePass ships with sensible defaults, but four documented options raise the bar further. Each is in the official help and takes a minute to set:

Add a key file to your master key. KeePass can require a key file alongside the master password (a composite master key). An attacker then needs both the passphrase and the file. Keep the key file somewhere the database is not — the point is separation.
Raise the key-derivation work factor. Under Database Settings > Security, KeePass can calibrate KDF iterations to a one-second delay on your own machine. You wait one second per unlock; an attacker waits one second per guess.
Shorten the clipboard timeout. Copied passwords are cleared automatically (12 seconds by default); Tools > Options > Security lets you shorten it or make Auto-Type your habit instead.
Lock the workspace automatically. KeePass can lock itself after inactivity or when the PC locks, so a walked-away desk never means an open vault.

None of these change the core answer — the encryption is sound either way — they narrow the user-side risks below, which is where real-world failures happen.

The three risks that are yours to manage

Master password strength. The KDF slows attackers down; it cannot save "Summer2026!". Use a four-to-five-word passphrase.
Backups. Offline-only means nobody can restore your vault but you. Two copies, two places, tested once.
Download integrity. Get KeePass only from the official distribution and verify the SHA-256 — our download page publishes the checksums we computed and links them against the author's integrity page. Unofficial repacked installers are the main real-world attack vector for tools like this.

Is KeePass safe — FAQ

Is KeePass safe?: Yes. KeePass encrypts your database with AES-256 or ChaCha20, is fully open source under GPL v2, and stores nothing on any server. Its main risks are user-side: a weak master password, no backups, or downloading a tampered copy from an unofficial mirror.
Has KeePass ever been hacked?: The KeePass program has had documented vulnerabilities over the years — for example CVE-2023-32784, which could leak the master password from a memory dump and was fixed in KeePass 2.54 — but there has never been a breach of user vaults, because there is no server holding them.
Is KeePass safer than cloud password managers?: It removes a different risk. KeePass has no server to breach, so incidents like the 2022 LastPass vault theft cannot happen to it; a cloud manager protects you better against losing your own device or file. Which is safer depends on whether your bigger risk is a vendor breach or your own backups. See KeePass vs Bitwarden.
What encryption does KeePass use?: KeePass encrypts databases with AES-256 by default, with ChaCha20 available, and derives the key from your master password using AES-KDF or Argon2 (KDBX 4). These are the same algorithm families used across the industry, as documented in the official KeePass help.
Can I trust a KeePass download from this site?: You do not have to trust us — and should not have to trust anyone: our buttons link to the official SourceForge distribution, we publish the SHA-256 checksums we computed, and you can verify your file against the author’s own integrity page before running it.
Can someone open my .kdbx file without the master password?: No — not with any practical attack, provided your master password is strong. The file is encrypted with AES-256 or ChaCha20 and there is no backdoor, no recovery mechanism and no vendor who could unlock it. That cuts both ways: if you forget the master password, the data is gone for everyone, including you.
Has KeePass ever been independently audited?: Yes. KeePass was selected for a public code audit under the European Commission’s EU-FOSSA project in 2016, which reported no critical vulnerabilities. Beyond formal audits, its open source and the independent reimplementations of the .kdbx format mean the code and format are under continuous outside review.
What is the weakest point of KeePass security?: The master password, and the machine KeePass runs on. Database encryption cannot compensate for a guessable passphrase or an already-compromised PC with a keylogger. A long passphrase and a clean system matter more than any setting inside KeePass.